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Abstract How large a risk is society prepared to run with the climate system? This is a
question of the utmost difficulty and it admits a variety of perspectives. In this paper we
draw an analogy with the management and regulation of insurance companies, which are
required to hold capital against the risk of their own financial ruin. Accordingly, we suggest
that discussions about how much to reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases could be
framed in terms of managing the risk of ‘climate ruin’. This shifts the focus towards decid-
ing upon an acceptable risk of the very worst-case scenario, and away from how “avoiding
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” has come to be framed polit-
ically. Moreover it leads to the conclusion that, in terms of greenhouse gas emissions today
and in the future, the world is running a higher risk with the climate system than insurance
companies run with their own solvency.
1 Introduction
Risk and uncertainty are central to assessing the consequences of climate change and for-
mulating response strategies (e.g. Kunreuther et al. 2013; IPCC 2014). One key question is:
how large a risk (risk in the broad sense) is society prepared to run with the climate system?
This question is at the heart of enduring debates about the appropriate level of ambition,
globally, in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It is a question of the utmost difficulty, how-
ever. For one thing, as Jones et al. (2014) concisely put it: “No universal criterion exists for
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a good decision, including a good climate-related decision”. Thus a wide variety of legit-
imate perspectives exists. For another, even if we could settle on a single perspective, a
question such as this remains difficult to answer, because of the timescales, uncertainties
and magnitudes of change that must be contemplated.
In this paper we seek to add a new perspective to the debate, which is to compare the risk
that the world is running with the climate system, defined in terms of the risk of ‘climate
ruin’, with the comparable risk that insurance companies are prepared or allowed to run with
their own financial ruin. This is hence an example of an actuarial perspective on climate
change. In doing so, we follow a tradition of attempting to reason about our tolerance of
climate risk by examining how other risks are managed in society (e.g. Posner 2004).
In the next section we summarise the system of company management and public reg-
ulation that governs insurance companies’ risk of ruin in many countries. In Section 3 we
draw the analogy with the management of climate risk, by discussing what ruin would mean
in terms of climate impacts. Admittedly the analogy is far from straightforward, but we can
make progress by drawing upon analyses of ruin, catastrophe and collapse in related fields
of intellectual inquiry, and we set out what makes climate ruin a distinctive perspective,
compared with the now dominant focus on avoiding “dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system” (United Nations 1992, p9). In this section, we also set a threshold
for climate ruin in terms of the increase in global mean temperature above the pre-industrial
level. We argue for a 4 ◦C threshold, based on current evidence. Section 4 shows how
physical modelling can be used to estimate the probability of climate ruin as a function of
cumulative greenhouse gas emissions. This forms the basis of our comparison of the risk
that the world is running with the climate system and the risk that insurance companies are
prepared or allowed to run with their own financial ruin. The former appears to be larger
than the latter. Section 5 offers some conclusions.
2 The risk of ruin for insurance companies
Insurance companies are required to hold capital against the risk of failing to meet their
liabilities, in particular of failing to pay claims to their policyholders in an unusually bad
year, in which there are too many claims. Bankruptcy can follow. This is known in the
industry as the ‘risk of ruin’. An insurer has to calculate how much capital it needs to hold in
order to reduce the probability of ruin below an acceptable level. This threshold is either set
by the regulator, or at a level that assures policyholders and investors the insurance company
is safe.
For example, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) sets the capital requirement
such that the risk of ruin is no more than 1 in 200 (i.e. 0.5 %) over a one-year time hori-
zon (FSA 2008). This is the same probability that sets the capital requirement in the EU’s
new Solvency II Directive (Swain and Swallow 2015). In practice, insurance companies
normally hold sufficient capital such that the risk of ruin is far lower than this level. Large
reinsurance companies such as Munich Re and Swiss Re typically aim for a credit rating in
the region of AA. An estimate of the average default probability for corporations rated AA
over a one-year horizon is currently 0.02 % or 1 in 5000 (RatingsDirect 2015).
There is a key difference between assessing capital requirements and setting premium
rates for insurance policies. Setting premium rates requires estimating the mean of future
claims payments (i.e. losses) arising from insurance policies. It is difficult to know what the
mean loss is for any particular insurance policy, but it is not usually necessary to include a
margin for prudence within the estimate, because the insurance company would normally
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expect to overestimate the expected loss in some cases and underestimate it in others. In
contrast, the capital requirement is estimated once (usually annually) for the entire insurance
company, so errors cannot be averaged out. In setting capital requirements, the focus is on
the extreme right tail of the probability distribution of loss for the entire company.
The system therefore prioritises resilience to shocks, and the strategy is consistent with
the pursuit of robustness and safety margins that can be found in many other areas of
decision-making under uncertainty (Kunreuther et al. 2013). There is even some evidence
to suggest that it has made the insurance industry more resilient to natural catastrophes
such as earthquakes and hurricanes (Best 2014; Massey et al. 2003), although a convincing
demonstration of cause and effect has yet to be made.
3 Climate ruin
Whereas ruin of an insurance company is relatively clear-cut – the company becomes insol-
vent – what might ruin mean in the context of climate change? Climate ruin could mean
different things at different spatial scales, but in this paper we focus on global reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions. Our aim is to show how the framework can contribute to debates
about global emissions targets, including attempts to evaluate whether the sum of existing
efforts by countries to cut emissions is sufficient (e.g. UNEP 2015). In doing so, we adopt a
perspective akin to the role of a global social planner – sometimes described as a ‘benevo-
lent dictator’ – in economic evaluation of climate policies. That means the phenomenon of
ruin that interests us occurs on a global scale, although it does not imply climate impacts fall
evenly across the world. Indeed there is no reason to expect them to do so (IPCC 2014). It
also means that our ultimate aim is normative in character. Investigating the risk of climate
ruin that society is currently running is a means to understanding whether that risk ought
to be reduced through further mitigation, or other strategies. For the most part we do not
directly consider adaptation as a response strategy, but we must make implicit assumptions
about it in order to judge how damaging emissions will be.
A representative dictionary definition of ruin is “The state or condition of a ... society
which has suffered decay or downfall” (Oxford English Dictionary 2014). This implies
attention should focus on the magnitude of climate change that triggers severe negative
impacts, and that those impacts must affect the economic and social domains, but it still
leaves much to be clarified. As a means of sharpening our understanding of what constitutes
climate ruin, it is worth reviewing comparable notions of ruin, catastrophe and collapse in
different fields of research.
Catastrophes and disasters in economics There has periodically been strong interest
in economics in rare disasters and catastrophes, and their implications. To take a prominent
recent example, Barro (2006) has argued that acknowledging the existence of rare economic
disasters can reconcile the predictions of standard theory about asset prices with observa-
tions. Barro’s definition of a rare economic disaster, which is what is of interest here, is quite
natural for an economist: a sharp contraction in income/output per capita. In particular, he
looks at instances during the 20th century when a country’s real GDP per capita fell by 15
per cent or more over a period of three to eight years. The main causes of these contractions
were World Wars I and II, and the Great Depression.
An exceptionally large contraction in income per capita is the natural definition of ruin
in economics, because income per capita is the benchmark measure of living standards,
individual well-being and social welfare. Accordingly, this is the principal way in which
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the spectre of catastrophe has been considered in the economics of climate change (Martin
and Pindyck 2015; Weitzman 2009, 2012), but with three important differences. First, the
spatial scale of analysis shifts from the country to the globe. Second, economic models of
climate change use a broader definition of income per capita, where it serves as an equiva-
lent measure of individual well-being, something that is not directly observed. This means
that mortality, among other things, can be included, so ruin can mean loss of life, as well as
loss of income. Third, the timescale over which income contracts becomes less clear, but in
general the analysis extends over at least a century and sees a climate catastrophe as unfold-
ing over decades, not just years. On the other hand, as Posner (2004) points out, the rate of
physical change cannot be so slow that adaptation eliminates the risk of social and economic
ruin. In quantifying economic catastrophe in terms of income per capita and mortality, and
looking into the long-run future, these recent analyses are close in spirit, if certainly not in
methodology, to the Limits to Growth series that began with Meadows et al. (1972).
Collapse of historical civilisations An extensive body of research has studied instances
of the collapse of historical civilisations, and the reasons for them. Examples, of which there
are many (Motesharrei et al. 2014), include the Roman Empire in Europe, Maya civilisation
in Central America, and Khmer Empire in Southeast Asia. While there is naturally a strong
overlap with economists’ measures of collapse, in that collapsing civilisations usually expe-
rience large declines in economic activity and increases in mortality, the focus of this work
is nonetheless distinctive. For our purposes, it adds political and social dimensions. In addi-
tion, since historical civilisations tended to collapse over decades, not years, it extends our
time horizon in line with the notion of a climate catastrophe in economics, and away from
transitory economic recessions in the 20th century.
According to Tainter, a “society has collapsed when it displays a rapid, significant
loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity” (Tainter 1988, p4). Diamond
(2005) adopts a similar definition of “a drastic decrease in human population size and/or
political/economic/social complexity” (p3). Therefore collapse is, as Tainter puts it, “funda-
mentally a matter of the sociopolitical sphere” (p4). Measures of a collapse of sociopolitical
complexity include: reduced social stratification and differentiation; reduced economic spe-
cialisation; a breakdown in centralised control and the rule of law; reduced flows of goods,
services and information; reduced investment in monumental architecture, and so on. Some
of these phenomena were certainly experienced during Barro’s (2006) rare economic dis-
asters of the 20th century, in particular in European countries during and immediately after
the two World Wars. In other countries in his data set, however, disaster was not charac-
terised by the sheer loss of sociopolitical complexity found in the collapsing civilisations
of the pre-industrial world. Nonetheless, the modern world clearly is capable of generating
collapses, such as Rwanda and Somalia (Diamond 2005).
Climate thresholds and tipping elements In climate research, concern about the
prospect of catastrophe and collapse has been a primary motivation for analysing phys-
ical thresholds in the climate system. These are sometimes described as tipping points
that correspond with ‘tipping elements’ of the system (Lenton et al. 2008), or in other
words ‘large-scale singular events’ (IPCC 2014). The worry is that crossing these tipping
points would bring about abrupt climatic and environmental change. Instances of abrupt cli-
mate change can be found in both the instrumental and paleoclimatic records, such as the
Dust Bowl drought and the Younger Dryas cold event respectively (see National Research
Council Committee on Abrupt Climate Change 2002; Alley et al. 2003). Not all tipping
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points/elements are likely to be associated with abrupt climate change, but some are, in that
they have a transition timescale of years or decades (Lenton et al. 2008).
A feature of this work is that it has remained largely focused on the physical phenomena
in question, with some work on related abrupt change in ecosystems, rather than the social
and economic consequences of crossing tipping points (Keller et al. 2008; Lenton 2011).
There is very little work that does the latter, especially in a comprehensive manner, simply
due to the difficulties involved in modelling the consequences of abrupt change formally.
What does exist appears to be within the realm of Integrated Assessment Modelling, which
is a relatively flexible medium. In IAMs, the characteristic approach to incorporating tip-
ping points is via a reduced form. For example, Keller et al. (2004) represent shutdown of
the Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation in the DICE model as a step increase in global GDP
losses as a function of crossing a threshold in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse
gases. Similarly, Lemoine and Traeger (2014) introduce tipping points to the equilib-
rium climate sensitivity parameter and the removal of atmospheric CO2 in DICE, while
Whiteman et al. (2013) add a large pulse of methane, released from melting permafrost, to
the standard PAGE model. Climate ruin in these studies is hence an economic phenomenon,
modelled in the abstract.
Dangerous climate change The process of giving meaning to “dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system”, introduced by Article II of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; United Nations, 1992), is also clearly of
relevance, given the common-sense similarities between the notions of dangerous climate
change (Dessai et al. 2004) and climate ruin. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord recognised
an existing line of thought, which can be traced back at least as far as a European Union
decision in 1996 (Council of the European Union 1996), that 2 ◦C marks the threshold for
dangerous anthropogenic interference (Randalls 2010). The Paris Agreement goes beyond
this by including the stated aim of “holding the increase in the global average temperature
to well below 2 ◦C ... and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ◦C above
pre-industrial levels” (United Nations 2015).
The difficulty is that it has always been unclear what risk is being tolerated of missing the
2 ◦C (or 1.5 ◦C) threshold for dangerous anthropogenic interference. The correspondence
between a given emissions path and warming is uncertain. Moreover, the political process
has been unable to give clarity on what would constitute an acceptable probability of missing
the target, a lack of clarity that is further diminished by the disconnect between the stated
aim to hold temperatures down and pledged emissions reductions at the Copenhagen and
Paris Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC (den Elzen et al. 2011; UNEP 2015).
Critics have accused the 2 ◦C target of being an exercise in political obfuscation (Victor
and Kennel 2014). At the very least it seems clear that the UN temperature targets have not
closed the debate about how much to reduce emissions.
Summary: what is climate ruin and when might it be triggered? We might simply
treat climate ruin and dangerous climate change as being interchangeable concepts, and
therefore adopt the 2 ◦C or even 1.5 ◦C targets as a threshold for climate ruin. This approach
cannot be dismissed out of hand, yet it is doubtful that the evidence supports it, because,
unlike the meaning of dangerous climate change in politics, our definition of climate ruin
is a worst-case scenario at the global level. This is not only the strongest analogy with ruin
of insurance companies, where it is an existential risk to the company, it is also consis-
tent with how ruin is conceived in the literatures surveyed above. These literatures depict
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rapid – but still multi-decadal – breakdown of economic activity, human health and
political/social order and complexity.
We can evaluate the recent contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC’s Fifth Assess-
ment Report in this light. It revives the Panel’s tradition of summarising the impacts of rising
temperatures with five ‘reasons for concern’ (IPCC 2014). At 2 ◦C above the pre-industrial
level, IPCC classifies the level of three of the five key risks (i.e. reasons for concern) as
high: the risks to unique and threatened systems, the risks of extreme weather events, and
the risks for disproportionately affected people and communities. On the other hand, the
risks of global aggregate impacts and the risks of large-scale singular events are moderate.
At 4 ◦C above the pre-industrial level, all five key risks are high and in the case of unique
and threatened systems they are very high. If we think of what environmental, economic
and social impacts are consistent with a worst-case scenario at the global level, then it can
be argued that the risks of global aggregate impacts and of large-scale singular events are
key. On the basis of the IPCC’s reasons for concern then, we suggest linking climate ruin
with no fewer than 4 ◦C of warming (also see New et al. 2011; Schellnhuber et al. 2012).
Before moving on, it is important to point out that doing so appears to be inconsistent
with the evidence presented in the majority of economic IAMs. Most of these models do
not forecast large impacts of climate change until the global mean temperature reaches an
exceedingly high level. At 4 ◦C above pre-industrial, standard versions of the three lead-
ing IAMs estimate impacts equivalent to a loss of global GDP of about 1–5 % (Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon 2010). If the global economy grows as it tends to
at several per cent per year, this clearly constitutes modest damages. However, the damage
forecasts of IAMs, in particular at high temperatures, have been criticised for being entirely
driven by assumptions that cannot currently be constrained by data (Pindyck 2013; Revesz
et al. 2014). Some have further argued that these assumptions are inconsistent with other
impacts research and are thus implausible (Stern 2013; Weitzman 2012). Consequently
alternative assumptions have been proposed, which generate much larger damages at 4 ◦C
above pre-industrial (Dietz and Stern 2015; Weitzman 2012). Ultimately the damage func-
tions in IAMs can be made to represent any assumptions and we therefore doubt whether
the evidence from these models is sufficiently strong at this time to justify an alternative
threshold for climate ruin.
4 Emissions limits to avoid climate ruin
The risk of ruin in the insurance industry applies year to year, because companies can adjust
premia and vary capital holdings on this timescale, i.e. it is assumed that they are not locked
into positions requiring resilience to be evaluated over a longer period. By contrast, the
global mean temperature depends on the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases
and therefore cumulative carbon emissions over centuries, i.e. our position is significantly
locked in. This makes the choice of time horizon in analyses of the impacts of climate
change a thorny, if often neglected, issue. Many assessments are truncated at the end of the
21st century, but the atmospheric residence time of CO2 justifies a much longer-term view.
We take our objective to be to control emissions so as never to exceed the given probability
of climate ruin (i.e. we focus on peak warming, rather than transient or equilibrium warming
per se).
Table 1 reports estimates of the probability of exceeding 4 ◦C warming above pre-
industrial as a function of cumulative carbon emissions since pre-industrial from the one
major study to so far report these explicitly (Zickfeld et al. 2009). These estimates are
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Table 1 Estimates from
Zickfeld et al. (2009) of the
probability of exceeding 2–4 ◦C
warming above pre-industrial as
a function of cumulative carbon
emissions since pre-industrial
(gigatonnes of carbon)
Cumulative carbon 2 ◦C 3 ◦C 4 ◦C
emissions (GtC) min. max. min. max. min. max.
500 0.03 0.5 0 0.34 0 0.27
1000 0.34 0.8 0.03 0.51 0 0.4
1500 0.63 0.98 0.23 0.73 0.05 0.53
2000 0.81 1 0.48 0.89 0.18 0.69
3000 0.92 1 0.75 1 0.53 0.91
4000 0.95 1 0.87 1 0.71 0.99
generated from an ensemble of simulations of an Earth System Climate Model. The
min-max range is generated from a range of probability density functions of the climate
sensitivity, coupled with two deterministic assumptions about the strength of the climate-
carbon cycle feedback. Since linking climate ruin with 4 ◦C warming is not beyond dispute,
we also report estimated probabilities of exceeding 2–3 ◦Cwarming. We cannot report prob-
abilities of exceeding 5 ◦C warming or more, because the underlying study does not report
them either.
Before drawing conclusions from Table 1, it is important to highlight the limitations
of the notion of probability in this setting, where the degree of correspondence between
the climate model on which the analysis is based and the real climate system is unknown
(Stainforth et al. 2007). There is in other words no guarantee these model probabilities
correspond with the real probability of the climate system warming 2–4 ◦C in response
to a given pulse of cumulative carbon emissions. At the same time, the degree of bias is
essentially unknowable. The fact that Zickfeld et al. (2009) report a range of probabilities
illustrates the probabilities themselves are uncertain.
With this caveat in mind, let us compare the probability of climate ruin in Table 1 with
the probability that insurance companies are prepared or allowed to run with their own
solvency. Recall from Section 2 that insurers’ risk of ruin has been capped by industry
regulators in many countries at 0.5 % over one year, which amounts to 40 % over 100
years, a more reasonable timescale for comparison with the probability of climate ruin. But
the actual risk appetite of insurers is usually lower. Companies seeking an AA rating will
face a risk of ruin of approximately 0.02 % over one year, which is 2 % over 100 years.
By comparison, Table 1 shows that the probability of peak warming of 4 ◦C may be as
high as 27 % even for historical cumulative emissions, which are of the order of 500GtC.
The probability increases significantly as cumulative emissions rise beyond 500GtC. IPCC
suggests that, along a baseline emissions scenario, 1000GtC will have been emitted cumu-
latively before 2060 with certainty (Clarke et al. 2014). The same analysis shows that there
is about a 50 % chance of cumulative emissions reaching 2000GtC by the end of the cen-
tury, which as Table 1 shows is associated with a probability of 4 ◦C warming of 18–69 %.
According to Rogelj et al. (2016), implementation of the pledges made at COP21 in Paris
(and continuing at a similar level of ambition after 2030) will most likely result in cumu-
lative emissions in the region of 1200GtC by 2100, with the lowest estimate being around
900GtC.
Although they do not report explicit estimates of the probability of 4 ◦C warming, data
reported in Allen et al. (2009) can be used as a basis for producing such estimates and thus
provide a point of partial comparison. These estimates are generated from an ensemble of
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a simple coupled climate-carbon cycle model, with uncertainty about five physical parame-
ters. According to our own fit of Allen et al. (2009, Fig. 3) cumulative carbon emissions of
1000 GtC since pre-industrial will lead to 4 ◦C warming with a probability of 16 %. This is
roughly in the middle of the range reported by Zickfeld et al. (2009).
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to augment our understanding of the level of risk (risk in
the broad sense) that society is running with the climate system, based on historical and
likely future emissions of greenhouse gases. The novelty has been in reasoning about this by
analogy with the insurance industry, which holds capital against the risk of ruin, a strategy
to ensure resilience against shocks. Contingent on setting the threshold for climate ruin at
4 ◦C warming above the pre-industrial level, it is clear that society is currently running a
larger risk with the climate system than insurance companies are prepared or allowed to run
with their own solvency. This is even clearer, if climate ruin is expected to be triggered by
less than 4 ◦C warming.
Attention naturally turns to what one should conclude from the comparison. On the one
hand, it might be argued that there are legitimate reasons why society tolerates a greater
amount of climate risk. One such reason might be that climate risk is costlier to reduce
than the risk of ruin for insurance companies, which is essentially their cost of solvency
capital. Another, related reason is that global catastrophe risks like climate ruin might not be
governable in the same way as an insurance company can relatively easily manage its risk
of ruin. From the point of view of a global social planner, the risk of nuclear war that was
run during the Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance, may well have been unacceptable, but the
key protagonists were not acting like a global social planner, which is of course a fictitious
concept.
On the other hand, it might be argued that the comparison reinforces the case for greater
ambition in reducing greenhouse gas emissions globally. Indeed, a strict interpretation of the
modelling data in Table 1, reinforced by Allen et al. (2009), would be that (net) emissions
reductions need to be exceptionally deep, in order to bring the risk of climate ruin down to
a level comparable with the risk of ruin for insurance companies. Geoengineering technolo-
gies that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere may be required. Indeed, if climate
ruin does occur at 4 ◦C above pre-industrial, and efforts to reduce net emissions prove
unsuccessful, a case might also be made to pursue solar radiation management (Keith 2013),
although it has been questioned whether geoengineering technologies as a whole are polit-
ically feasible, effective in regulating climate, or safe (Vaughan and Lenton 2011; Barrett
et al. 2014). The other response strategy in the face of climate ruin is of course adaptation.
The idea of climate ruin implies adaptation would need to be ‘transformational’, defined as
adaptations “that are adopted at a much larger scale or intensity, those that are truly new
to a particular region or resource system, and those that transform places and shift loca-
tions” (Kates et al. 2012). As IPCC makes clear, adaptation and mitigation are not wholly
substitutable, rather limits to adaptation mean that the two are partly complementary strate-
gies (IPCC 2014). Therefore it would seem the most that transformational adaptation could
achieve in this setting is a partial reduction in necessary reductions in net carbon emissions.
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